Action Experience Changes Attention to Kinematic Cues by Courtney A. Filippi & Amanda L. Woodward
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 15 February 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00019
Edited by:
Jacqueline Fagard,
University Paris Descartes – Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique,
France
Reviewed by:
Carolyn Palmquist,
Amherst College, USA
Shoji Itakura,
Kyoto University, Japan
*Correspondence:
Courtney A. Filippi
cfilippi@uchicago.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Developmental Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 17 October 2015
Accepted: 06 January 2016
Published: 15 February 2016
Citation:
Filippi CA and Woodward AL (2016)
Action Experience Changes Attention
to Kinematic Cues.
Front. Psychol. 7:19.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00019
Action Experience Changes
Attention to Kinematic Cues
Courtney A. Filippi* and Amanda L. Woodward
Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
The current study used remote corneal reflection eye-tracking to examine the
relationship between motor experience and action anticipation in 13-months-old infants.
To measure online anticipation of actions infants watched videos where the actor’s hand
provided kinematic information (in its orientation) about the type of object that the actor
was going to reach for. The actor’s hand orientation either matched the orientation of
a rod (congruent cue) or did not match the orientation of the rod (incongruent cue).
To examine relations between motor experience and action anticipation, we used a 2
(reach first vs. observe first) × 2 (congruent kinematic cue vs. incongruent kinematic
cue) between-subjects design. We show that 13-months-old infants in the observe
first condition spontaneously generate rapid online visual predictions to congruent hand
orientation cues and do not visually anticipate when presented incongruent cues. We
further demonstrate that the speed that these infants generate predictions to congruent
motor cues is correlated with their own ability to pre-shape their hands. Finally, we
demonstrate that following reaching experience, infants generate rapid predictions
to both congruent and incongruent hand shape cues—suggesting that short-term
experience changes attention to kinematics.
Keywords: action anticipation, infancy, motor resonance, motor experience, social cognition
INTRODUCTION
The ability to anticipate others’ actions allows us to interact with our social partners eﬀectively.
By proactively shifting gaze toward the end point of an action before that action is complete, we
can eﬃciently coordinate our actions with others. Research suggests that the ability to anticipate
the actions of social partners begins to emerge in infancy and may be coupled with one’s ability
to produce these actions oneself (Gredebäck and Kochukhova, 2010; Kochukhova and Gredebäck,
2010; Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011; Cannon et al., 2012; Falck-Ytter, 2012; Ambrosini et al., 2013).
Despite considerable interest in the link between action experience and action anticipation, it
remains unclear how the motor system translates diﬀerent experiences into predictions about
others’ actions—particularly early in life when the motor system is changing rapidly. The current
study examines the eﬀects of reaching experience on action anticipation.
Action experience happens on multiple time scales: across minutes, hours, months, and
even years. To date, studies have investigated the relation between action experience and
action anticipation by examining experience across two timescales: long term, developmental
timescale (across months) and immediate experience (across minutes) timescale. The
developmental timescale compares infants who have acquired one skill level to those
who have acquired another (e.g., comparing walkers to crawlers). In comparison, research
investigating the role of immediate experience examines whether providing action experience
immediately before test (typically referred to as motor priming) changes action anticipation.
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Research has shown that adults and infants are inﬂuenced by
experience across both timescales.
Across the developmental time scale, research has shown
that long-term experience (or expertise) performing an action
changes how rapidly both infants and adults predict action
events: those with more experience tend to anticipate the timing
of others’ actions more accurately (e.g., Aglioti et al., 2008;
Stapel et al., 2016) and generate faster visual anticipations
to the action endpoint (Gredebäck and Kochukhova, 2010;
Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2010; Daum and Gredebäck, 2011;
Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011; Cannon et al., 2012; Ambrosini
et al., 2013). For instance, infants with more experience
grasping objects generate faster visual anticipations to grasping
actions but not back of hand actions or mechanical claw
actions—suggesting a correspondence between action prediction
and motor development (Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011). The
experience of reaching for objects continues to develop
throughout infancy as infants acquire ﬁne motor skills and reach
more eﬃciently for objects. Ambrosini et al. (2013) investigated
whether these additional developments in ﬁne motor control
(speciﬁcally in the ability to use a precision grip to grasp small
objects) are correlated with action anticipation. Infants observed
a person reach for one of two balls using either a whole-hand
grip or a precision grip. Following action observation, they
tested infants’ own ﬁne motor skills. They found that infants
who used fewer ﬁngers to grab small objects generated faster
visual predictions to others’ precision grip actions—suggesting
that infants’ ﬁne motor ability is linked action anticipation. Thus,
across a developmental timescale more experience performing an
action is correlated with faster action anticipation.
While these ﬁndings show that long-term experience is
related to infants’ visual anticipation of actions, as yet, it is
not known whether (or how) immediate experience aﬀects
action anticipation. Studies that have looked at global levels of
attention indicate that there are eﬀects of immediate experience
on action perception. To illustrate, Sommerville et al. (2005)
gave 3-months-old infants experience coordinating their gaze
and manual contact for the ﬁrst time either before or after
testing infants’ sensitivity to others’ goals. They found that only
those infants who received this action experience ﬁrst, show
global attention diﬀerences in response to the goal structure
of others’ actions. This ﬁnding and others like it (Hauf et al.,
2007; Sommerville et al., 2008; Gerson and Woodward, 2012,
2013) suggest action priming can change some aspects of infants’
attention to others’ actions. While global measures of visual
attention provide information at a gross-level of description, they
do not provide information about changes in attention as events
unfold.
To date, it remains unclear whether (in addition to global
attention diﬀerences) action priming also aﬀects ﬁne-grained
aspects of online visual attention. Two studies have examined
the eﬀects of action priming on one measure of ﬁne-
grained visual attention (i.e., infants’ online action anticipation)
and the ﬁndings are mixed. Gredebäck and Kochukhova (2010)
tested action anticipation to puzzle actions before or after infants
put together puzzles themselves. They found no diﬀerences
across testing orders—suggesting that some types of experience
may not inﬂuence infants’ anticipation of others’ actions. In
contrast, Cannon et al. (2012) found some evidence that prior
experience inﬂuenced infants’ action anticipation. Speciﬁcally,
(although they didn’t ﬁnd group level improvement following
action priming) they found that the amount of action infants
engaged in prior to the action observation task inﬂuenced how
rapidly they anticipated others’ actions (but only among those
infants who acted ﬁrst)—that is, infants who put more toys into
the bucket generated faster predictions to the bucket during the
subsequent action observation phase.
The current study was designed to address why we ﬁnd
these diﬀerent eﬀects of experience on action anticipation. We
examined the eﬀect of experience across these two timescales by
systematically varying the infants’ own experience prior to action
observation. Infants were either assigned to engage in a reaching
task before (i.e., reach ﬁrst condition) or after (i.e., observe
ﬁrst condition) the action observation phase. We reasoned that
the reach ﬁrst condition would provide information about the
immediate eﬀects of action on visual anticipation. In contrast,
the observe ﬁrst condition would provide information about
diﬀerences in spontaneous action anticipation as a function of
developmental variability in motor skill.
As a test case, we also assessed one aspect of infants’ motor
skill: infants’ own hand pre-shaping ability. By 13-months
infants’ own reaching behavior is anticipatory (von Hofsten
and Ronnqvist, 1988; Claxton et al., 2003). For example, infants
pre-shape their hands in anticipation of the size, shape, and
orientation of objects before making contact with those objects
(Lockman et al., 1984; von Hofsten and Fazel-Zandy, 1984; von
Hofsten and Ronnqvist, 1988; Morrongiello and Rocca, 1989).
Hand pre-shaping is both a motor behavior that infants engage
in and a behavior that (during action observation) could provide
information about the type of object a person is reaching for. As
such, we expected that 13-months-old would be adept at using
this kinematic cue to generate visual predictions about reaching
events.
To determine whether 13-months-old infants recruit
kinematic details of others’ action to generate action predictions
we designed an action observation task where infants observe
one of two types of reaching events: either the orientation of an
actor’s hand matches the orientation of the object that the hand
makes contact with (i.e., congruent reach) or the orientation
of the hand fails to match the target object (i.e., incongruent
reach). Previous research has compared action anticipation
when kinematic cues are present (e.g., hand pre-shapes into a
precision grip) vs. absent (e.g., ﬁst reaches toward object; see
Ambrosini et al., 2013). We reasoned that our task could be
more challenging because in the incongruent reaching event, the
hand pre-shaping information matches one object on the screen
yet the actor always reaches for the object that is incongruent
with hand pre-shaping. We hypothesized that 13-months-old
infants would spontaneously generate faster visual predictions
when the target could be predicted by (congruent cue) the hand
pre-shaping than when the target could not be predicted by
(incongruent cue) hand pre-shaping.
The ﬁrst aim of the current study is to evaluate whether
infants’ own hand pre-shaping is correlated with their
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 19
Filippi and Woodward Experience and Attention to Kinematics
recruitment of kinematic cues independent of their immediate
experience. To do so, we also assess infants’ own hand pre-
shaping ability by giving these infants the opportunity to reach for
a toy after the action anticipation task (Observe ﬁrst condition).
We reasoned that by recruiting variability across a developmental
timescale we could examine whether there is a relationship
between spontaneous attention to others’ actions and infants’
own motor skill. In line with previous research, we hypothesized
that infants who spontaneously pre-shaped their hand more
(in the observe ﬁrst condition) would generate faster visual
predictions when the kinematic cue was congruent but that this
relationship would not be found in the incongruent kinematic cue
condition. This would provide converging evidence that infants
draw on their experience pre-shaping their hands when they
recruit kinematic cues to anticipate others’ actions—particularly
when kinematic cues are present and reliable.
Our second aim was to assess whether immediate action
experience changes attention to kinematic cues. To do so,
we gave infants the opportunity to reach for a toy before
(Reach ﬁrst condition) we assessed their action anticipation.
We hypothesized that if immediate action experience facilitates
attention to kinematics, then infants in the reach ﬁrst condition
would generate faster congruent predictions than the infants in
the observe ﬁrst condition because their motor system is already
primed to attend to kinematics. Alternatively, if immediate action
experience facilitates attention to goal, infants in the reach ﬁrst
condition may generate equally fast predictions on congruent
and incongruent trials.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Chicago
approved the protocol for this study and written consent
was provided by infants’ parents/legal guardians prior to
participation.
Participants
Participants were 70 full-term 13-months-old infants (36 females,
M = 13 months, 2 days, SD = 9 days, range = 12; 12–13;
21) recruited from a large metropolitan city. Half of the infants
(n = 36) were randomly assigned to do the eye-tracking task
before the reaching task (Observe ﬁrst condition) and half of
the infants (n = 34) were randomly assigned to perform the
reaching task before watching the eye-tracking videos (Reach
ﬁrst condition). 44% of infants were European American, 25%
were African American, 3% were Asian, 10% were Hispanic, and
17% were mixed ethnicity. An additional 46 infants were tested
but excluded from analyses due to fussiness during eye-tracking
(n = 9), equipment failure (n = 7), failure to calibrate or percent
data collected less than 50% (n = 11), fewer than three trials
of predictive looks (n = 181) and refusal to participate in the
behavioral task (n = 1).
1In our analyses we excluded infants that did not generate three predictive looks
because our primary analyses concerned average latency scores. Here, we report
the number of participants in each condition that were excluded for this reason:
Apparatus and Stimuli
Data were collected via corneal reﬂection using a Tobii T60
XL eye-tracker (accuracy 0.5◦, sampling rate 60 Hz) with a 24′′
monitor, from a viewing distance of ∼60 cm. Infants sat on their
parents lap and parents were asked not to direct infant’s attention
during testing.
Infants watched a short video of a hand reaching for one of two
rods. See Figure 1 for screenshots of each phase of the video as
outlined below. These rods always remained in the same location
(i.e., the blue rod was always on the left and the red rod was always
on the right). The videos were timed such that infants were given
1000 ms to notice the rods before the hand entered the scene.
After this time, the hand entered the scene ﬂat on the table (event
duration: 1000 ms). The hand then formed a shape and paused in
that shape for 2000 ms. While retaining this shape, the hand then
moved forward equidistant between both rods (event duration:
1000 ms). The hand continued in a smooth motion deﬂecting
toward one of the two rods until it contacted that target rod
(event duration: 1500 ms). Once the hand grasped the target rod
it paused in this position for 500 ms.
Procedure
Action Observation Task
Eye-tracking beganwith a nine-point calibration period, followed
by two blocks of videos. Each block consisted of six identical
trials in which a hand reached (once per trial) for an object
using a hand shape that was congruent with the target object (i.e.,
the object that the hand ultimately grasps) or incongruent with
the target object. Each infant received one block of congruent
trials and one block of incongruent trials, with the order of trial
blocks counterbalanced across infants. Pilot data indicated order
eﬀects; as such we do not report data from the second block
here.
In the ﬁrst block of trials, infants either watched one of
four possible congruent reaches (congruent cue) or one of
four possible incongruent reaches (incongruent cue). Congruent
reaches always correctly anticipated the orientation of the rod
before the midpoint of the reach (see Figure 1). In contrast,
incongruent reaches failed to match the orientation of the rod up
until the hand was about to make contact with it, and the initial
posture of the hand was appropriate for the non-target object
(see Figure 1). Across infants, the order of the blocks, the side
reached to, the hand shape, and the orientation of the objects were
counterbalanced.
Reaching Task
Either before (Reach ﬁrst condition) or after (Observe ﬁrst
condition) the eye-tracking task, infants were encouraged to
reach for a rod presented by an experimenter. The rod
was presented ∼19 cm from the infant. The experimenter
presented the rod in one of two orientations (horizontal
or vertical). The order of presentation was constant for
Reach ﬁrst-Congruent cue: n = 3; Reach ﬁrst-Incongruent cue: n = 8; Observe
ﬁrst-Congruent cue: n = 3; Observe ﬁrst-Incongruent cue: n = 4. This suggests
that infants in the Reach ﬁrst-Incongruent cue condition were twice as likely to be
excluded for not looking to the target.
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FIGURE 1 | Depiction of congruent (top) and incongruent (bottom) video events. These are two examples taken from a set of four possible congruent
reaches and four possible incongruent reaches. Listed below each screenshot is the event duration. From left to right: Only objects present, hand enters scene flat
on the table, hand forms shape and pauses, hand moves forward equidistant between the objects, hand deflects toward one of the objects, hand grasps object and
pauses.
all infants. The experimenter ﬁrst presented the rod in a
horizontal orientation for ﬁve trials, then oriented the rod
vertically for ﬁve trials, then alternated between horizontal
and vertical orientation every trial thereafter. The experimenter
presented the rod to the infant until they became fussy or lost
interest. On average infants reached 19.48 times (SD = 7.932,
range = 3–49)2.
Eye-Tracking Data Reduction
Data were exported using the Tobii Fixation ﬁlter with the
strict average eye selection criteria. Fixations were classiﬁed using
35 pixels/window velocity and distance threshold.
Areas of Interest (AOIs)
The current study only examines the timing of ﬁxations that
were directed toward the hand and objects areas of interest
(AOIs; these AOIs are made visible in Supplementary Figure
S1). The target object AOI was deﬁned as the object that the
hand ultimately reaches for, whereas the distractor object is the
untouched object. These AOIs are ∼5◦ of visual angle oﬀ center.
These AOIs were found in pilot testing to capture most visual
ﬁxations toward the object. Participants were unaware of these
regions of interest as they were only present during the data
reduction process.
Coding Criteria
In order to determine whether a look to the target AOI (or
distractor AOI) was indeed generated based on attention to hand
shape, we established the following criteria for all visual ﬁxations
to be included in this dataset: (1) infants had to ﬁrst ﬁxate within
the hand AOI, (2) this ﬁxation to the hand had to occur after the
2Only 2 infants reached fewer than seven times. All other infants reached at least
nine times.
hand began to form its shape, (3) infants next ﬁxation had to be
toward one of the two objects. We recorded the time of ﬁrst looks
to both the target and distractor objects.
Latency to Predict the Target Object
Latency scores were determined by subtracting the time that the
hand was outside of the target object AOI (see Supplementary
Figure S2) from the time of the ﬁrst visual ﬁxation to the target
object. Average latency scores were used to assess how rapidly
infants visually anticipated the actions of others. Average latency
scores that exceeded 2.5 SD from the group mean (n = 1) were
removed from subsequent analyses.
Looks to the target object that occur after the hand enters the
target AOI are considered reactive. Compared to other work on
infant action anticipation, this is a rather conservative measure of
which looks are anticipatory. Given this scoring system, negative
values represent prospective looks to the target object, 0 is the
time that the hand enters the object AOI, and positive values
represent reactive looks to the target object.
Global Measures of Attention
Attention was also measured by assessing the duration of time
that infants looked to the target object AOI, the distractor object
AOI, and the hand AOI. We evaluated total attention to the
event with a whole screen AOI and we also analyzed attention
to each AOI separately. All summary statistics are computed as
an average across all trials.
Distractor Predictions
Since action observation events provided hand shape cues that
always matched one of the two objects, it is possible that infants
that observe an incongruent cue would be more likely to generate
predictions to the distractor object. To test whether there were
diﬀerences in infants’ propensity to generate ﬁrst predictions to
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FIGURE 2 | Still image of infant hand pre-shaping behavior on horizontal rod orientation trials (A) and vertical rod orientation trials (B) of the motor
behavior task.
the distractor, we analyzed the proportion of trials that each
infant generated a predictive look to the distractor ﬁrst. We
averaged distractor predictions across all trials to create an
average proportion of distractor predictions score.
Behavioral Data Reduction
We also coded infant reaching behavior during the motor
behavior task to determine whether hand pre-shaping is related
to action anticipation.
Hand Pre-shaping during Reaching
To examine the kinematics of infants’ own movement, on each
reaching trial we coded whether infants pre-shaped their hand
to match the orientation of the target object prior to contact
with the object (see Figure 2). Coding was performed oﬄine
using Interact, a digital coding program (Mangold, 2010). The
initiation of the reach was identiﬁed as the ﬁrst frame when the
infant moved toward the rod. The end of the reach was identiﬁed
as the time when the hand ﬁrst touched the rod. Since infants
could interact with the object any way they wished on each trial,
we eliminated data from any trial where the infants’ goal was not
to grasp the object and trials where the hand shape was identiﬁed
as ambiguous such that the coder could not identify whether it
was a match or not. We found that on average infants pointed to
the object instead of reaching on 0.314 (SD = 0.692, range = 0–
3) trials and infants acted in a way that we couldn’t identify as
goal-directed on average 1.59 (SD = 1.63, range = 0–7) trials.
After eliminating trials where the infant did not grasp the toy, we
computed an average score indicative of the proportion of trials
that the infants pre-shaped their hand to match the orientation of
the rod as they reached. A second independent coder coded 25%
of infants and the two coders were in agreement on 93% of trials.
RESULTS
In the design of the experiment, the testing orders provide
information about two diﬀerent timescales: developmental time
scale and immediate experience time scale. The observe ﬁrst
condition, provides information about the relationship between
spontaneous action anticipation and the kinematics of infants’
own actions. In contrast, the reach ﬁrst condition can tell us
how immediate experience changes action anticipation. Below
we present analyses to examine infants’ attention to action
kinematics and the relationship between infants’ own actions
and their anticipation of actions they observe. We begin with
the observe ﬁrst condition. Then, we present data from the
reach ﬁrst condition. Finally, we investigate similarities and
diﬀerences between the two conditions to assess the eﬀect
of immediate experience on visual attention and infants’ own
reaching behavior.
Preliminary analyses indicated no reliable eﬀects of gender, age
(as a covariate), number of trials infants reached during action
task (as a covariate), whether the hand reached to the right or
left, handshape (horizontal vs. vertical grip) or rod orientation
(horizontal vs. vertical) or the number of visual predictions
generated (all ps > 0.111) on gaze latency. However, there was a
main eﬀect of the orientation of the target object [F(1,62)= 3.984,
p < 0.050] on gaze latency—indicating that infants generated
faster visual predictions to the vertically orientated target. This
is unsurprising given that the vertical object AOI extends down
closer to the hand than the horizontal object. Importantly,
there were no interactions between target object orientation
and condition (reach ﬁrst vs. observe ﬁrst) or cue (congruent
vs. incongruent). Therefore, these factors were not included in
subsequent analyses.
Observe First Condition
Figure 3A summarizes gaze latency scores across cue type
(congruent vs. incongruent) for the Observe First condition. To
begin, we asked whether infants reliably anticipated the hand’s
arrival to the target before the hand entered the target AOI.
To determine whether infants reliably anticipated the hand’s
arrival, we compared average latency scores to 0—the time when
the hand enters the target AOI. One sample t-test indicated
that infants who observed congruent kinematic cues generated
rapid saccades to the target and these looks to the target arrived
before the hand entered the target object AOI [t(17) = −4.728,
p < 0.001]. In comparison, infants that viewed incongruent
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FIGURE 3 | Average mean latency scores for infants in the observe
first condition (A) and reach first condition (B).
reaches did not look to the target before the hand entered
the target AOI [t(17) = −1.244, p < 0.230]. An independent
samples t-test was conducted on latency scores with trial type
(congruent vs. incongruent) as the between subjects factor. Based
on prior research, we also expected that infants would make faster
predictions when hand pre-shaping matched the target object.
Consistent with previous research, we found that gaze latency
scores for congruent cues were faster compared to incongruent
cues [F(1,34) = 3.214, p < 0.041, one-tailed]. Together, these
ﬁndings suggest that infants spontaneously recruit kinematic
cues to generate visual predictions.
In the action observation events the hand shape always
anticipates one of the two objects. As such, it’s possible that
infants that watched incongruent reaches were more likely to
generate predictions to the distractor object than infants that
watched congruent reaches. If so, this could suggest that infants
have diﬃculty ignoring kinematic cues. To test whether this was
the case, Z-test of two population proportions was conducted
on the proportion of distractor predictions with cue type as the
between subjects factor. We found that infants did not diﬀer in
the proportion of distractor predictions generated (Z =−0.209,
p > 0.834, congruent cue M = 0.152, SD = 0.243; incongruent
cueM= 0.150, SD= 0.189). In combination with the gaze latency
ﬁndings, this suggests that incongruent kinematic cues did not
lead infants to produce wrong guesses about the target object.
Nevertheless, saccades to the target were slower on incongruent
compared to congruent trials. We suspect that this may be due
to the availability of other cues (e.g., direction of motion) and
because the trial always ended with the hand grasping one of the
objects.
We next evaluated whether hand pre-shaping behavior
correlated with how rapidly infants generated visual predictions.
In line with previous research (Ambrosini et al., 2013), we
found that the proportion of trials where infants’ hand shape
matched the orientation of the rod during the reaching task was
correlated with how rapidly infants generated visual predictions
(r = −0.541, p < 0.021) on congruent trials—that is, more
hand pre-shaping behavior predicted faster visual predictions
on congruent trials (see Figure 4). To examine whether this
eﬀect was driven by some infants being more motivated to
reach for toys, we tested whether this relationship held when
FIGURE 4 | Observe first- congruent cue condition.Mean gaze latency
as a function of hand pre-shaping behavior.
controlling for the number of times infants reached in the motor
behavior task. We found that even after controlling for the
number of trials infants reached, this eﬀect remained signiﬁcant
(r= −0.622, p< 0.008). Critically, we found that this relationship
was selective. Infants that viewed incongruent cues did not
show this correlation (r = 0.344, p < 0.177). These ﬁndings
suggest that motor experience is selectively linked to generating
predictions when kinematic cues are present and reliable—
not to actions where the target is incongruent with kinematic
cues.
These ﬁndings are concordant with a body of research
(Ambrosini et al., 2011, 2013; Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011)
demonstrating that motor skill is linked to action anticipation.
In the next section, we test whether we see similar patterns of
behavior following immediate action experience.
Reach First Condition
Next we examined whether immediate reaching experience
changes recruitment of kinematic cues to generate visual
predictions. Figure 3B summarizes gaze latency scores across
cue type (congruent vs. incongruent) for the Reach First
condition. To begin, we assessed whether infants reliably
predicted the target. One sample t-test indicated that infants
who observed congruent cues [t(18) = −2.527, p < 0.021]
and incongruent cues [t(17) = −2.877, p < 0.010] generated
predictive saccades that entered the target AOI before the
hand. To determine whether gaze latency diﬀered across cue
type, we conducted an independent samples t-test on gaze
latency with cue type (congruent vs. incongruent) as a between
subjects factor. We found no signiﬁcant eﬀect of cue type
[t(32) = 0.377, p < 0.708]. These ﬁndings suggest that infants
who received reaching experience immediately before action
observation generated rapid visual anticipations regardless of cue
type.
Follow-up analyses indicated that (just like infants in the
observe ﬁrst condition) infants in the reach ﬁrst condition did
not show a diﬀerence in the proportion of distractor predictions
across congruent (M = 0.202, SD = 0.281) and incongruent
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cue (M = 0.247, SD = 0.292) type (Z = −0.788, p > 0.430).
Again suggesting that infants were able to generate predictions
to the target object regardless of cue. We next asked whether the
manner in which infants reached and grasped the toy was related
to gaze latency. To do so, we examined the relationship between
hand pre-shaping and gaze latency. We found no correlation
between gaze latency and hand pre-shaping (ps > 0.198)—
suggesting that planning one’s own actions was not related to
predicting others’ actions.
Comparing Observe First and Reach
First Conditions
To determine whether there were any group diﬀerences in motor
behavior or visual attention that could account for diﬀerences in
performance between our reach ﬁrst and observe ﬁrst conditions,
we ran follow up analyses to compare the groups.
Motor Behavior Task Performance
We might ﬁnd diﬀerences in infants’ performance on the action
observation task because infants in the observe ﬁrst condition
may have more advanced motor skills than those infants in
the reach ﬁrst condition or because reaching early or late
in the testing session may result in diﬀerences in behavioral
performance. To assess whether this was the case, we used an
independent samples t-test to compare the proportion of trials
where infants pre-shaped their hands in the motor behavior
task across conditions (observe ﬁrst vs. reach ﬁrst). Results
indicated no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion of trials
with hand pre-shaping across the reach ﬁrst (M = 0.89)
and observe ﬁrst conditions [M = 0.91; t(67) = −0.706,
p< 0.483].
Comparing Visual Attention to the Action Observation
Events
We could have found diﬀerential recruitment of kinematic cues
across conditions if infants in the reach ﬁrst condition were not
attending to the action observation videos as much as infants
in the observe ﬁrst condition or if reaching prior to action
observation resulted in fatigue during the action observation
session. To examine these possibilities, we next conducted a
one-way ANOVA on total attention with condition (reach ﬁrst
vs. observe ﬁrst) and cue type (congruent vs. incongruent) as
factors. We found no diﬀerence in how long infants attended
to the action events across condition (observe ﬁrst vs. reach
ﬁrst), cue type (congruent vs. incongruent) and no signiﬁcant
interaction (ps > 0.372). To further assess whether allocation
of attention diﬀered across conditions, we examined whether
infants attended to all parts of the action events equally. The
two groups did not vary in allocation of attention to the hand
(ps > 0.255), target object (ps > 0.234), or distractor object
(ps > 0.297). Thus, infants attended equally to all aspects of the
action events.
Gaze Latency
Analyses within condition (reach ﬁrst vs. observe ﬁrst) suggest
that there are diﬀerences in gaze latency. As a way to evaluate
how the latencies across conditions are related to one another
we compared latency scores across both conditions. To assess
whether there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in gaze latency across
the two conditions we conducted an univariate ANOVA on gaze
latency with condition (reach ﬁrst vs. observe ﬁrst) and cue
type (congruent vs. incongruent) as between subjects factors.
We found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in gaze latency across
condition (p > 0.973) or cue type (p > 0.346) and no interaction
(p > 0.138). This suggests that while we found diﬀerences in
the relative speed at which infants generated predictions in the
observe ﬁrst condition, we do not ﬁnd that these diﬀerences
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those infants in the reach ﬁrst
condition.
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that infants can recruit
kinematic cues to generate action predictions. Furthermore,
infants spontaneously recruit their own motor skill to generate
action predictions. We also found that the experience of reaching
for objects changes action prediction: when provided experience
reaching for objects prior to action observation, we ﬁnd that
infants generate equally fast predictions to congruent reaches
and incongruent reaches. This eﬀect is not driven by low-level
attention to the observed stimulus and cannot be accounted
for by the number of trials that infants reached for the
toy.
DISCUSSION
The current study examined the relationship between action
experience and action anticipation. Infants were randomly
assigned to either observe actions before (Observe ﬁrst condition)
or after (Reach ﬁrst condition) a motor task. To assess action
anticipation we used a novel paradigm that varied the action
observation event in terms of whether the hand pre-shaping
did (congruent cue) or did not (incongruent cue) predict the
orientation of the target object. Consistent with prior research,
we found that infants who observed the action events ﬁrst
(Observe ﬁrst condition) recruited kinematic cues to generate
predictions. Additionally, we found that infants’ own hand
pre-shaping behavior predicted how rapidly they generated
predictions when the kinematic cue was congruent with the
target (see Ambrosini et al., 2013 for similar ﬁndings). In
comparison, infants who engaged in a motor behavior task before
observing action events (Reach ﬁrst condition) generated rapid
visual predictions to both congruent and incongruent kinematic
cues. Together, these ﬁndings suggest that action experience
across diﬀerent time scales may inﬂuence action anticipation
diﬀerently.
Action Anticipation: The Developmental
Timescale Perspective
The observe ﬁrst condition ﬁndings provide converging evidence
for the claim that infants recruit kinematic cues when they
are available (Ambrosini et al., 2013) and that there may be a
correspondence between infants’ motor abilities and anticipation
of others’ actions (Kochukhova and Gredebäck, 2010; Kanakogi
and Itakura, 2011; Cannon et al., 2012; Ambrosini et al.,
2013). Our design also expands upon this body of work by
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testing action anticipation when the motor cue is incongruent
with the target object. Previous research has shown that
infants generate faster covert shifts in the direction of a
hand’s opening compared to when an object appears to be
incongruent with a hand’s opening (Daum and Gredebäck, 2011).
In contrast, the current study shows that infants use hand
orientation information to generate online visual anticipations
when an actor is choosing between two objects. Our ﬁndings
harmonize with previous research—both studies show that
infants are faster to generate predictions on congruent trials
compared to incongruent trials. Further, we show that on
incongruent cue trials, infants generated looks to the target
that (on average) arrived at approximately the same time that
the hand made contact with the rod. This suggests that the
tendency to recruit kinematic information may be diﬃcult to
override.
By including incongruent reaching events, we were able
to assess the tendency to recruit kinematic information when
this information is incompatible with the target object. Our
incongruent events were perceptually identical to the congruent
events up until the moment that the hand made contact with the
toy. Thus, diﬀerences in action anticipation were due to attention
to the relationship between the kinematics of the observed action
and the target objects orientation. This paradigm allowed us
to assess infants’ tendency to use kinematic information on
incongruent trial events by examining infants’ propensity for
generate predictions to the distractor object. We show that when
infants observed events where hand pre-shaping is incongruent
with the target, infants, nevertheless, generate predictions to the
target. We suspect that this may be because the incongruent
reaches that infants observe always result in the hand grasping
one of the two toys. After a demonstration of this actor’s
preference, infants may override their processing of the kinematic
cue to generate a target prediction. If the reach was never
completed, we may not have found such a strong propensity to
generate target predictions. Future work is needed to examine
this possibility.
Action Anticipation Following Immediate
Experience
Following immediate reaching experience, we found that infants
generated rapid predictions to both congruent and incongruent
cues. Furthermore, we found that the amount of reaching
performed during behavioral testing and the extent to which
their own grasping behavior matched the observed action, did
not correlate with gaze latency. Our ﬁndings also indicated that
there were not diﬀerences in infants’ global attention to the
action observation events. Infants across both conditions (reach
ﬁrst vs. observe ﬁrst) attended to the action observation videos
for similar amounts of time and distributed their attention to
the target object, hand, and distractor object AOIs similarly.
This suggests that infants’ visual attention to the events was
comparable but that the motor behavior task may have primed
infants to recruit the information in the action observation videos
diﬀerently. These ﬁndings suggest that immediate experience
reaching changes attention to (and use of) kinematic cues.
Furthermore, this change may not be due to an overt shift in
visual attention to others’ movements. We speculate that action
priming may prime attention to the goal structure of others’
actions (rather than drawing attention to the speciﬁcs of how
an actor moves). We suspect that infants in our study are
shifting their attention toward the goal structure of others’ actions
following action priming because these infants reliably anticipate
the target object on incongruent trials. While our ﬁndings
primarily speak to the speed of infant’s visual anticipations, it
could be that action priming facilitates more rapid interpretation
of the action in terms of the actor’s goal or that action priming
leads infants to rapidly perceive the actor-goal relation (even in
the face of incongruent kinematic information).
The sensorimotor system is organized hierarchically (see
Rosenbaum et al., 2004; Grafton and Hamilton, 2007 for review)
and as such actions can be described at multiple levels. One
interpretation of our reach ﬁrst condition data could be that
immediate action experience may prime a motor representation
higher than kinematics. This would be in line with our ﬁnding
that infants who receive action experience before observation,
do not recruit kinematic cues in the same way that infants
spontaneously recruit kinematic information. However, it is also
possible that infants recruit kinematic information in addition
to higher representations of the action goal (or recruit them
concurrently) and this leads infants to be able to override their
sensitivity to incongruent kinematic cues. Future research is
needed to evaluate whether this could be the case.
Research suggests that experts (e.g., expert golfers, soccer
players, etc.) tend to pay less attention to the kinematics of their
own actions and more attention to their goal. Indeed, when
acting, experts’ performance suﬀers when they attend to the
speciﬁc movements involved in their action (Beilock et al., 2002;
Beilock and Gray, 2012). Similar eﬀects have been found with
young infants learning to coordinate their visual and manual
actions in sequences. Gerson and Woodward (2013) trained
8-months-old infants on how to pull a cloth to obtain an
out of reach toy by either highlighting the means (cloth) or
the goal (toy). They found that infants learned more rapidly
and sustained this learning throughout training if the training
emphasized the goal of the action rather than the means needed
to achieve the action (Gerson and Woodward, 2013). Given
the close link between action execution and action observation
across the lifespan (Kontra et al., 2012), it’s possible that devoting
considerable attention to the ﬁne details of movement either
during movement or immediately prior to observing someone
else could make it more diﬃcult to see the goal structure of an
action sequence—particularly early in life. In line with this idea,
research has also shown that the experience of coordinating visual
and manual actions immediately before observing others act,
facilitates attention to others’ goals—not to the manner in which
arms move through space (Krogh-Jesperson and Woodward, in
preparation; Sommerville et al., 2005; see Woodward et al., 2009
for review). When considered in combination with our reach
ﬁrst condition ﬁndings, our work provides converging evidence
for this claim. Future research should manipulate action tasks to
highlight either the goal or the manner used to achieve the goal
and assess eﬀects on action anticipation.
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Limitations
While these results suggest that there are diﬀerences across
conditions in how reliably infants generate anticipatory
predictions to the target, we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in overall gaze latency scores. This suggests that while infants
are on average generating predictions to the target before the
hand enters the target AOI (in all conditions except when
observing incongruent trials in the observe ﬁrst condition),
overall prediction speeds are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across
conditions. This raises a number of questions about the extent
to which action priming changes action prediction. Our ﬁndings
suggests that priming may change the relative speed of action
prediction—that is, action priming may help infants reliably
generate predictions ahead of hand movement particularly
when faced with incongruent kinematic cues. Whereas, infants
spontaneous behavior (i.e., observe ﬁrst condition) suggests that
they are likely following the hand’s motion (as they do not
generate saccades to the target before the hand enters the target
AOI) when faced with incongruent kinematic cues.
One reason that we see no overall diﬀerences across conditions
may be because there is substantial individual variability in
infants’ action prediction speed that is unaccounted for—possibly
due to diﬀerences in general cognitive abilities (e.g., inhibitory
control or speed of processing). Indeed, generating a prediction
to the target requires the capacity to inhibit looking at the moving
hand. This capacity may be underdeveloped at 13 months and
limit the range of latency scores. Future research should examine
the factors that could contribute to the large variability found
across conditions.
CONCLUSION
The current study provides novel insight into the link between
action experience and action anticipation. Many studies suggest
that action experience (Sommerville and Woodward, 2005;
Sommerville et al., 2005; Woodward et al., 2009; Gerson and
Woodward, 2014) is at the center of action understanding.
This past research tested whether action experience changes
infants’ high-level understanding of actions (i.e., that actions
are structured by goals; e.g., Flanagan and Johansson, 2003;
Sommerville and Woodward, 2010). Our data suggest that
comparing these timescales can provide us new information
about the mechanism that facilitates rapid anticipatory shifts
in attention. We show that infants’ immediate experience
changes their recruitment of kinematic cues: following a simple
reaching task, infants generated rapid predictions to the target
object, regardless of kinematic cue congruency. This is diﬀerent
from how infants spontaneously recruit kinematic information.
Without immediate reaching experience, infants appear to use
kinematic information to generate predictions and they recruit
their own ability to execute this speciﬁc motor skill.
In conclusion, these ﬁndings provide novel evidence to
suggest that diﬀerent types of action experience (e.g., lifetime vs.
immediate) could prime infants to recruit motor cues in diﬀerent
ways. Indeed, our ﬁndings suggest that immediate experience
may prime attention to action goals rather than kinematics. We
suggest that this harmonizes with studies of adult skill expertise
and infant action understanding. Together these ﬁndings raise
new questions about the role that the motor system and action
hierarchies may play in the development of action anticipation
abilities.
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